A fundamental lesson was the importance of financial prudence and understanding the value of money . Having started the company with very limited capital, the entrepreneur developed a deep appreciation for financial resources. This likely influenced their approach to spending and investment as the company grew. Another key takeaway was the necessity of building a fundamentally sound and profitable business . While some views in the "new economy" suggested profit wasn't essential, the entrepreneur believed strongly in achieving profitability. They focused on reaching break-even as a survival milestone and actively worked towards generating profit, viewing it as a crucial indicator of a real business, not just a valuation play. The experience of the dot-com bubble burst highlighted the importance of assessing risk and ensuring the company's resilience . A great entrepreneur, it is noted, is skilled not only at identifying opportunities but also at evaluating risks. This includes assessing whether the company's cost structure allows it to survive adversity and ensuring sufficient financial reserves exist, even during market booms. Scaling the business effectively after raising funds required a strategic approach. The entrepreneur learned that growth needed to be substantial to meet investor expectations, moving beyond small incremental increases. A significant factor in achieving rapid growth (35 times in 3 years) while remaining profitable was identifying and leveraging a "repeatable profitable unit" (RPU) , such as a sales person who consistently generated profit, allowing them to scale by adding more such units. Finally, the entrepreneur's long-term vision of building a large, independent company with an IPO goal influenced their financial and scaling decisions, prioritizing sustainable growth over potentially quicker exits like acquisition. They also learned that while a reasonable office is necessary for employees, excessive spending on fancy premises can be seen as a negative indicator by investors, suggesting a lack of focus on core business fundamentals. ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ) Firstly, graduating from IIM Ahmedabad in 1989 provided a strong educational foundation. However, the context highlights that he did not come from a very rich background, which likely influenced the early financial constraints faced when starting his company. He mentioned starting with only 2,000 Rupees, indicating a need for bootstrapping and survival in the initial phase. Secondly, his decision to quit his job after a total of about five years of work experience (three years before IIM and about 18 months after) was a deliberate choice. He was very keen to be an entrepreneur and believed that waiting longer would make it harder to quit, as he might get too accustomed to the salary and corporate life. This suggests a conscious effort to pursue his entrepreneurial aspirations relatively early in his career. Furthermore, his previous work experience, including his last job in marketing at a company that made Horlicks, likely provided him with valuable skills and insights, although the context does not detail this aspect extensively. More importantly, he had a clear intention not to work his way up a large corporation as an employee manager beyond a certain point, which motivated him to step out and figure out an alternative path. Finally, the initial years of his entrepreneurial venture, which began around 1996-97, involved a period of 6-7 years without clear direction, and the idea was initially perceived negatively by others. This early struggle and the need to persevere despite external doubt and limited resources were crucial experiences that influenced his resilience and approach to building a business from scratch. His later involvement in scouting and investing in startups also stemmed from this journey, shaping his perspective on identifying promising ventures like PolicyBazaar and Zomato. ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , ) Jeewansaathi operates in the online matrimony market, positioned as the third largest player, competing with Matrimony.com and Shaadi.com. Its competitive strategy, often referred to as its "moat," is centered around offering a differentiated freemium model. While all major matrimony sites utilize a freemium approach where basic actions like registration, searching, expressing interest, and accepting interest are free, Jeewansaathi distinguishes itself by making certain features free that its competitors typically charge for. A key element of Jeewansaathi's differentiation is offering free chat functionality. Users can chat with others on the platform without needing a paid membership, a feature that requires payment on competing sites. This strategic choice is made even with the understanding that it might lead to some revenue loss, as users might exchange contact information during free chat instead of paying to contact directly. This approach aims to attract users and create a distinct value proposition. ( , , , , , ) A method described involves leveraging the sales team's daily interactions with clients. Sales representatives would collect feedback from clients and prospective clients during their calls. This feedback, including client comments, insights on competition, and suggestions for product improvement, was then shared daily within a dedicated communication channel, such as a Yahoo Groups email. This approach ensured that client insights were not siloed but were accessible across different teams, including product, marketing, and senior management. This continuous flow of customer feedback was instrumental in driving the product improvement pipeline and ensuring that the company was addressing customer needs and preferences. Maintaining a database for collecting and accessing this customer insight is also highlighted as important for cross-team availability. ( , , , , , ) Info Edge has developed a systematic approach to making investments, which has contributed to their success in identifying promising startups. Their process involves a dedicated team, mentioned as comprising 10 to 15 people, whose role is to evaluate potential companies. This team reviews a significant number of startups, potentially thousands in a quarter. Key factors they consider when assessing a company for investment include a compelling value proposition, a strong idea, and the quality of the people involved, particularly the founders. For instance, in the case of Policybazaar, the value proposition was considered very compelling, and the individuals were seen as good people, even though the company had not yet launched at the time of initial assessment. They also evaluate the quality of the product or service being offered. Over time, Info Edge has invested in a large number of startups, close to 100, with notable successes including investments in companies like Zomato and Policybazaar. ( , , , ) you choose the right investors? Because like you mentioned, certain investors had certain claws, which were quite, uh, quite strange. No, no, all inv all investors had, But then you chose a particular investor because you're more comfortable. So today VCs are just pouring in cash and if you are a good company, they will call you. So when you get multiple calls from VCs, how do you gauge and check, which is the right VC to go with? Because the standard practice out there, or the standard mindset initially for all the entrepreneurs, is that the best valuation is the best investor, but then how do you, how do you put a method to this madness? Sir. So I think, uh, investor compatibility, okay, is, is quite important and it's important for a founder to assess that. Uh, because uh, do you do you want an investor who will tell you what to do? Maybe you do certain kind of investors more hands on than others? Will you want an investor who will, uh, let you be? because you want to independence want to build it on your own there, certain other kind of investor who's rep reput for that. Okay, there are certain investors who believe that founders can be replaced. I mean, if required, certain others don't. It's important to do ref checks on investors. Of course, all this becomes, uh, an issue only if you have more than one offer, if you have only one offer, that's your only offer. And what exactly are the parameters that every entrepreneur is supposed to check? Sir? One is investor compatibility. The other is using ref check you, You check what exactly is the philosophy of operation philosophy style, you know, and so on. So what are the three most important question? No, no. But you see, then you also check U, You know, how patient is the investor because you may need 10 years to build a big company, but he may want to exit in five and that becomes important. Okay. Uh, you may want to check how large is the fund size. Uh, that still remains to be invested because when you do your next round and next round, and next round, can they follow on the check? or not understood, Sir, most founders will have an opinion on the investors. Okay. If you know somebody, well enough, hopefully he'll be candidate with you. Okay. And sir, uh, when it comes to angel investments, you know, we I've been studying Blinket obsessively for the past two years and two years back. I I had this entire board with all the numbers saying that there's no way this thing would make money unless they cross an a AOV of 540 rupees. And there was some crazy method I did because I'm a geek in these things And then two years later this whole thing picked up And now when we looking at Blinket, it has crossed 635 Zepto has crossed 500 and everything is just suddenly picking up. So during that time, how is it that somebody takes such a bold call that being a customer myself? And I spoke to a lot of people they said that, you know, this is crazy, but, uh, it doesn't look very sustainable because I don't know if I'm going to stick with it for a very long time. So, sir, how is it that somebody's able to take such a great judgment or such a big leap of faith that they first acquire a company as big as growers, build something out of it? No. So I had the investment committee in the Theato board. Okay. Uh, and yeah, it was a tough decision because I we discussed it threadbear. And I remember asking deer, I said de your main business is making a loss. That time food is not profitable. Now it is I said investors are beating you up to make a profit the your share price is down right uh are you sure I'm damn sure I said look if you have two big loss-making businesses making large losses while you have enough cash in the bank you know and if there isn't good news emerging on food delivery I'll make a profit we'll make a profit food within a year I said yeah that's what we think and that's what it's looking like but supp it doesn't happen says no it'll happen. so I said you know you want to delay it he said no the oportunity will vanish. it's either now or never Finally he said listen trust me I know we can do it I've studied the company I know we can do it if in a dark store we can uh get a th000 orders a day. We're breaking even for that store Depending on density of population and distribution of dark stores we can do it but everybody says that India is such a price sensitive uh, market we now that we know that there's a bifurcation between India 1 India 2 India 3 back then. Sir. It was very difficult because you know when you talk to the customers themselves that judgement call because Sir they sell uh coriander for uh for what 3x 4x the price of what it is available in the market And yet people order I myself order because during that time I'm in a you're paying for 10-minute delivery you're paying for delivery at a time of day when it's all of the markets are closed and more importantly the value proposition is something that the customer also does not recognize until the customer gets habituated to the service So I think there is a there's emerged a very loyal customer base for blinket for delivery who are willing to pay the premium. And what is this madness of launching Playstation? why link it Sir, if it sells they sell it that's it People are buying it their margins time. Wow, sir. And how do you cultivate this acument to be able to spot these opportunities? high utility world of mouth automatically spreads out sir. you know word of mouth is something that I find very very fascinating. In fact Kunal Sha also put out a very beautiful strategy called the Delta 4 strategy to crack word of mouth from your understanding of Noer as well as other startups Is there a particular framework which you can actually follow to be able to crack word of mouth if something is useful and something is unique, only you have it, people will find you out. They will smell you. they will figure it out. And then they will tell their friends, you know, I've got something here, right? Uh, word of mouth will generally stop or reduce when everybody knows about it. So a I, as an individual have to find something useful and I should know about it and you don't know about it. I tell you about it and I feel I've done something good. I helped you out. It's reasonably natural natur. That word of mouth will happen because sir, often times what happens is that even though a company has a very unique proposition, that unique proposition is not something that is very easily explainable by most people. And this is the reason why the one thumb rule for this is that when you at a dinner table and you're having a conversation, how do you explain the idea? This is also coming from Kunal sha, when he said that if people cannot explain your ideas simply to each other, then word of mouth will not spread. Even if it's in the best ideas are very simple. Uh, in hindsight, 97, 96 and early 97. So we launched Noer in April 97. I saw the internet in October 96. So while we were working on it, in those 6 months, I took the idea to four or five people who were senior to me in business school, but were in the business of recruitment said, what do you think is idea? They all pretty much said it's a lousy idea. Really Okay. They could not comprehend the potential. What was their reasoning? Sir, You have to